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ABSTRACT 
 
Individual Risk Attitudes: 
New Evidence from a Large, Representative, 
Experimentally-Validated Survey 
 
This paper presents new evidence on the distribution of risk attitudes in the population, using 
a novel set of survey questions and a representative sample of roughly 22,000 individuals 
living in Germany. Using a question that asks about willingness to take risks on an 11-point 
scale, we find evidence of heterogeneity across individuals, and show that willingness to take 
risks is negatively related to age and being female, and positively related to height and 
parental education. We test the behavioral relevance of this survey measure by conducting a 
complementary field experiment, based on a representative sample of 450 subjects, and find 
that the measure is a good predictor of actual risk-taking behavior. We then use a more 
standard lottery question to measure risk preference, and find similar results regarding 
heterogeneity and determinants of risk preferences. The lottery question makes it possible to 
estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion for each individual in the sample. Using five 
questions about willingness to take risks in specific domains — car driving, financial matters, 
sports and leisure, career, and health — the paper also studies the impact of context on risk 
attitudes, finding a strong but imperfect correlation across contexts. Using data on a 
collection of risky behaviors from different contexts, including traffic offenses, portfolio choice, 
smoking, occupational choice, participation in sports, and migration, the paper compares the 
predictive power of all of the risk measures. Strikingly, the general risk question predicts all 
behaviors whereas the standard lottery measure does not. The best overall predictor for any 
specific behavior is typically the corresponding context-specific measure. These findings call 
into the question the current preoccupation with lottery measures of risk preference, and 
point to variation in risk perceptions as an understudied determinant of risky behavior. 
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 1 Introduction
Risk and uncertainty are pervasive in economic life, playing a role in almost every im-
portant economic decision. As a result, understanding individual attitudes towards risk
is intimately linked to the goal of predicting economic behavior. This paper uses new
data and new methodology in an attempt to address some of the challenging questions
surrounding this concept. In particular, do risk attitudes vary across individuals? If so,
what are the determinants of individual diﬀerences? Are hypothetical measures of risk
attitudes reliable predictors of actual risky behavior? What is the impact of context on
willingness to take risks? Is there a single underlying preference that determines risk-
taking in all contexts? How does the impact of personal characteristics vary with context?
Can survey questions incorporating situation-appropriate context outperform standard,
lottery-question measures of risk preference? How important are individual diﬀerences in
risk perception for explaining behavior, as opposed to risk preference?
Our evidence is based on a sample of roughly 22,000 individuals, substantially larger
than in previous studies of risk attitudes. The data are from the 2004 wave of the Socio-
economic Panel (SOEP), which is carefully constructed to be representative of the German
population. For each individual, the data provide a battery of new survey measures.
The ﬁrst measure asks about “willingness to take risks, in general” on an 11-point scale.
The second is a more standard measure of risk preference, in which respondents indicate
willingness to invest in a hypothetical lottery with explicit stakes and probabilities. Using
responses to this question, it is possible to calculate a parameter describing the curvature
of the individual’s utility function. There are also ﬁve additional questions, which use
the same scale as the general risk question, but ask about willingness to take risks in
speciﬁc contexts: car driving, ﬁnancial matters, sports and leisure, career, and health. In
a complementary ﬁeld experiment, based on a representative sample of 450 individuals,
we test the behavioral relevance of the general risk question, and ﬁnd that it is a good
predictor of risky choices with real money at stake. As a result of the experimental exercise,
this measure and the other similar measures in the SOEP are uniquely valid instruments
for inferring diﬀerences in actual risk-taking behavior.
The paper begins by presenting new evidence on the distribution of risk attitudes
in the population, and the determinants of individual diﬀerences. Initially, we focus on
1our most general measure, the general risk question, and construct a population-wide
distribution of willingness to take risks. This distribution reveals substantial individual
heterogeneity. Turning to possible determinants of these diﬀerences, we investigate the
relationship between willingness to take risks and selected personal characteristics: gender,
age, height, and parental background. We focus on these characteristics because they are
plausibly exogenous and therefore allow causal interpretation. The analysis reveals several
facts: (1) women are less willing to take risks than men, at all ages; (2) increasing age
is associated with decreasing willingness to take risks; (3) taller individuals are more
willing to take risks; (4) individuals with highly-educated parents are more willing to take
risks. These eﬀects are large and very robust, with the exception of parental education,
which becomes insigniﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. This evidence on determinants has
important implications. For example, diﬀerences in risk preferences could be one factor
contributing to the well-known gender wage gap, gender-speciﬁc behavior in competitive
environments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004), and gender diﬀerences
in career choice (Dohmen and Falk, 2005). The impact of age implies increased ﬁnancial
conservatism in ageing societies, and the height result points to a possible mechanism
behind the higher earnings potential of taller individuals (Persico et al., 2004). These four
ﬁndings also suggest characteristics that can be used to partially control for risk attitudes
in the absence of direct survey measures.
A chief advantage of survey questions is that they oﬀer a direct measure of individ-
ual attitudes, avoiding the need to recover behavioral parameters by making restrictive
identifying assumptions. Another advantage is the possibility of measuring attitudes for
a very large sample, at relatively low cost, because the questions are hypothetical and do
not involve real money. A potentially serious disadvantage of using hypothetical survey
questions, however, is that they might not predict actual behavior. In this paper we oﬀer
a solution to this dilemma: the combination of a large survey with a ﬁeld experiment
designed to validate the survey measures.
The primary methodological point of the paper is that ﬁeld experiments with a
representative subject pool can be used to validate survey measures, in order to end up
with both statistical power and conﬁdence in the reliability of the measures. To test the
validity of our survey measures, we conducted a ﬁeld experiment in which participants
had the opportunity to make risky choices with real money at stake, and also answered
2the general risk question from the SOEP. We used a representative sample of 450 adults
living in Germany as subjects, in order to match the sampling design of the survey. We
ﬁnd that answers to the general risk question are good predictors of actual risk-taking
behavior in the experiment. With a high level of conﬁdence we can therefore reject the
null hypothesis that this survey measure is behaviorally irrelevant.
It is important to compare results based on the general risk question to results using
a more standard lottery measure. The SOEP poses respondents with such a lottery, in
the form of a hypothetical investment opportunity: respondents are asked how much of
a windfall gain of 100,000 Euros they would invest in an asset that returns double, or
half, of their investment, with equal probability. In comparison to the general risk mea-
sure, this question incorporates the relatively concrete context of a real-world ﬁnancial
decision. It also gives explicit stakes and probabilities, holding perceptions of the risk-
iness of the decision constant across individuals. By contrast, the general risk question
potentially incorporates both risk preference and risk perception, i.e., individuals are free
to think about curvature of utility when choosing a value on the response scale, but also
to incorporate subjective beliefs about the stakes and probabilities typically involved in
taking a risk “in general.” The amount invested in the hypothetical asset turns out to
be strongly correlated with responses to the general risk question. The distribution of
investment choices reveals heterogeneity across individuals, and gender, age, height and
parental education all play a role in explaining diﬀerences in risk preferences. The eﬀects
of all of these exogenous factors are very robust and qualitatively similar to those observed
using the general risk question.
Combining investment choices with information on individual wealth, it is also pos-
sible to infer a range for each individual’s Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.
We construct a distribution of interval midpoints in the population, and ﬁnd support for
the range of parameter values typically assumed in economic models. We also illustrate
the ﬁrst step needed to interpret responses to the general risk question in terms of ranges
for parameter values: a mapping from responses on the general risk question to average
amounts invested in the hypothetical asset, which then imply parameter ranges.
A fundamental question surrounding the notion of risk attitudes is the relevance of
context. In economics it is standard to assume that a single, underlying risk preference
governs risk taking in all domains of life. In line with this assumption, economists typically
3use a lottery measure of risk preference, framed as a ﬁnancial decision, as an indicator
of risk attitudes in all other contexts, e.g., health. Some psychologists and economists,
however, have questioned whether stable utility functions and risk preferences exist at all,
given that risk attitudes appear to be highly malleable with respect to context in laboratory
experiments (e.g., Slovic, 1964, 1972a and 1972b; Eckel and Grossman, forthcoming). An
alternative interpretation of this evidence, of course, is that a stable risk preference does
exist, but that individuals believe the typical risk in one context is greater than in another,
and indicate diﬀerent willingness to take risks accordingly (Weber et al., 2002).
The ﬁve context-speciﬁc questions in the SOEP make it possible to study the impact
of context, but for a much larger and more representative group of individuals than the
typical laboratory experiment. Average willingness to take risks turns out to diﬀer across
contexts. However, the correlation across contexts is quite strong. Principal components
analysis tells a similar story: one principal component explains the bulk of the variation,
suggesting the presence of a single underlying trait, but each of the other components still
explains a non-trivial amount of the variation. Overall, these ﬁndings support a middle
position between the two extreme views. There is evidence for a single trait operating in
all contexts, suggesting that the standard assumption is a reasonable approximation. On
the other hand, something is varying across contexts. This could reﬂect some malleability
in risk preferences, but is more likely to reﬂect diﬀerences in risk perception. In fact, risk
perceptions are known to vary across individuals based on evidence from psychology.1 Like
the general risk question, the context-speciﬁc measures are able to capture diﬀerences in
risk perception, e.g., beliefs regarding the relative danger of driving versus playing sports.
The implication is that the standard approach – using lottery questions to predict behavior
in all contexts – may be reasonable to the extent that it captures a stable risk preference,
but also neglects a potentially important source of variation in context-speciﬁc willingness
to take risks.
The ﬁnal portion of the analysis compares the predictive power of all of the alter-
native risk measures, within and across diﬀerent life contexts. We identify a collection
of behavioral outcomes that spans the ﬁve contexts identiﬁed in the SOEP — portfolio
1 For example, a number of studies have asked directly about risk perceptions and have documented a
tendency for women to perceive dangerous events, such as nuclear war, industrial hazards, environmental
degradation, and health problems due to alcohol abuse, as more likely to occur, in conditions where
objective probabilities are diﬃcult to determine (Silverman and Kumka, 1987; Stallen and Thomas,
1988; Flynn et al., 1994; Spigner et al., 1993).
4choice, participation in sports, occupational choice, smoking, migration, subjective well-
being, and traﬃc violations — and then compare how well diﬀerent risk measures do at
predicting these behaviors. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that any single measure is a signiﬁcant
predictor of several of the behaviors, providing further validation of their behavioral rel-
evance. This validity across contexts also supports the standard assumption of a stable,
underlying risk preference. Importantly, however, the only measure to predict all of the
behaviors is the general risk question. In this sense the general risk question is the best
all-around measure. By contrast, the hypothetical lottery does not predict smoking, mi-
gration, or self-employment and predicts public sector employment with the “wrong” sign.
It is also striking that the best predictor of behavior in a given domain is typically the
question incorporating context speciﬁc to that domain. For example, willingness to take
risks in health matters is a better predictor of smoking than the hypothetical investment
question, or the general risk question, or any other domain-speciﬁc question. A likely
explanation for the better performance of the alternative measures is that they capture
additional information about the individual, in terms of context-speciﬁc risk perceptions,
e.g., the individual’s beliefs regarding the dangers of smoking. Overall, the evidence calls
into question the use of lottery questions to predict risky behavior in all contexts. This
approach is only optimal if risk preferences, and risk perceptions, remain constant across
contexts, which seems inconsistent with our ﬁndings. The implication is that the stan-
dard conception is overly preoccupied with risk preference, and that measures capturing
diﬀerences in risk perception, across individuals and contexts, are indispensable for the
ultimate goal of predicting behavior.
In summary, the paper contributes new evidence on the determinants and measure-
ment of individual risk attitudes. These conclusions are based on a substantially larger
sample than in previous studies, and on survey measures that are shown to be behav-
iorally relevant in an accompanying ﬁeld experiment. As such, the conclusions have a
broader scope than in previous studies and can be interpreted in terms of behavior with
more conﬁdence. Previous studies using relatively large, representative samples include
Guiso et al. (2002), Guiso and Paiella (2001), and Guiso and Paiella (2005), all of whom
use a sample of 8,135 heads of households in the Italian Survey of Household Income
and Wealth (SHIW) and measure risk preferences with an abstractly-framed, hypotheti-
cal lottery. Diaz-Serrano and O’Neill (2004) use the same sample but also add the next
5wave from the survey, which includes roughly 3,000 additional individuals. Donkers et al.
(2001) uses a sample of 4,000 individuals living in the Netherlands, one half of which is
representative and the other half of which is drawn from the top 10 percent of the income
distribution, and measures risk preferences with a series of abstract lotteries. Barsky et al.
(1997) uses an especially large sample, 14,000 individuals living in the US, but this comes
from the Health and Retirement Survey which is focused on individuals between 51 and 61
years of age. They measure risk preference using a hypothetical lottery involving diﬀerent
future income streams. Where it is relevant in the paper, we discuss the methodologies of
these complementary studies in more detail.
There are a number of cases in which the evidence in this paper provides a powerful
conﬁrmation of previous ﬁndings, but others in which the ﬁndings contrast strongly with
previous results. In particular, many previous studies have found a similar impact of
gender on willingness to take risks (for a meta-analysis, see Byrnes et al., 1999; for a
review of experimental evidence on gender eﬀects, see Eckel and Grossman, forthcoming).
This paper documents the same gender diﬀerence on a larger scale, but in contrast to
experimental evidence in Schubert et al. (1999), the eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of
concrete context in the question frame, e.g., as in the hypothetical investment scenario.
In fact, the gender eﬀect is present in all contexts, and at all ages, and is robust to
controlling for wealth and other personal characteristics. In terms of the age eﬀect, this
paper is one of the few to study the full range of ages over adulthood, (exceptions include
studies using the SHIW and Donkers et al., 2001), and the ﬁrst to investigate the impact of
age in a variety of contexts. Few previous papers have investigated the impact of parental
background on risk attitudes, with the exception of Guiso and Paiella (2001), and Guiso
and Paiella (2005), who look at father’s occupation (Hartog et al., 2002, ﬁnds a similar
impact of mother’s education in a sample composed of accountants). To our knowledge,
no previous paper has studied the relationship between height and risk attitudes.
The estimates of CRRA coeﬃcients in this paper diﬀer from previous studies in
that they incorporate detailed information on individual wealth, and are based on a lot-
tery with stakes that are large enough to be meaningful in terms of lifetime income (for
other approaches see Guiso and Paiella, 2005; Barsky et al., 1997; Donkers et al., 2001).
The analysis of risk attitudes across contexts has mainly been studied in psychology ex-
periments with much smaller sample sizes. Previous studies have found that standard
6measures of risk preference predict behaviors such as portfolio choice, smoking, and occu-
pational choice. Our measures have similar predictive power, but our ﬁndings also point to
the importance of context-speciﬁc risk perceptions in determining risky behavior. In par-
ticular, measures incorporating both risk preference and context-speciﬁc risk perceptions
outperform a standard lottery measure of risk preference.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the SOEP and the
risk measures. Section 3 investigates individual heterogeneity and exogenous determinants
of risk attitudes using the general risk question. Section 4 presents results on the behav-
ioral relevance of the general risk question, based on the complementary ﬁeld experiment.
Section 5 compares the distribution and determinants of investment choices in the hypo-
thetical lottery to results based on the general risk measure, and calculates individual risk
coeﬃcients. Section 6 assesses the stability of risk attitudes across diﬀerent domains of
life. Section 7 compares the predictive power of the diﬀerent risk measures for a collection
of behavioral outcomes. Section 8 concludes.
2 Data Description
The SOEP is a representative panel survey of the resident population of Germany (for a
detailed description, see Wagner et al., 1993, and Schupp and Wagner, 2002). The initial
wave of the survey was conducted in 1984.2 The SOEP surveys the head of each household
in the sample, but also gives the full survey to all other household members over the age
of 17. Respondents are asked for a wide range of personal and household information,
and for their attitudes on assorted topics, including political and social issues. The survey
also includes various subjective measures (e.g., life satisfaction) which are widely used
and recognized for their quality (see, e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004; Frijters et
al., 2004a and 2004b; van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). This paper is the ﬁrst to
use the new measures of risk attitudes added to the survey in the 2004 wave. The 2004
wave, which includes 22,019 individuals in 11,803 diﬀerent households, is the focus of our
analysis.
We analyze seven diﬀerent questions from the SOEP which ask, in diﬀerent ways,
2 The panel was extended to include East Germany in 1990, after reuniﬁcation. For more details on the
SOEP, see www.diw.de/gsoep/.
7about an individual’s risk attitudes.3 The ﬁrst question asks for attitude towards risk
in general, allowing respondents to indicate their willingness to take risks on an eleven-
point scale, with zero indicating complete unwillingness to take risks, and ten indicating
complete willingness to take risks.4 The next ﬁve questions all use the same scale, and
similar wording, but refer to risk attitudes in speciﬁc contexts: car driving, ﬁnancial
matters, leisure and sports, career, and health. All of these measures are characterized
by ambiguity, in the sense that they leave it up to the respondent to imagine the typical
probabilities, and stakes, involved in taking risks in a given domain.
The last risk question is diﬀerent, in that it corresponds more closely to the lottery
measures used in previous studies. The question presents respondents with the following
choice:
Imagine you had won 100,000 Euros in a lottery. Almost immediately after
you collect, you receive the following ﬁnancial oﬀer from a reputable bank, the
conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to double the money
within two years. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount
invested.
Respondents are then asked what fraction of the 100,000 Euros they would choose to
invest, and are allowed six possible responses: 0, 20,000, 40,000, 60,000 80,000, or 100,000
Euros.5 This measure shares the common feature of other lottery measures in that it
presents respondents with explicit stakes and probabilities, and thus holds risk perceptions
constant across individuals. Because beliefs are held constant, diﬀerences in responses are
more clearly attributable to risk preference alone, as compared to the six measures above,
which potentially incorporate both risk preference and risk perceptions. Under certain
assumptions, it is also possible to use responses to the hypothetical lottery to infer a
parameter describing the curvature of the individual’s utility function, corresponding to
3 There is also an eighth question asking about willingness to take risks when trusting strangers. This
question appears to measure something diﬀerent. For this reason we analyze responses to the trust
question in detail in a separate paper, see Dohmen et al. (2005a).
4 The exact wording of the question (translated from German) is as follows: How do you see yourself:
“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10
means: ‘fully prepared to take risk’.” German versions of all risk questions are available online, at
www.diw.de/deutsch/sop/service/fragen/personen/2004.pdf.
5 The exact wording is as follows: “What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest
in this ﬁnancially risky, yet lucrative investment?”
8the theoretical notion of risk preference.
3 Willingness to Take Risks in General
This section presents the distribution of willingness to take risks in the population, as
measured by the general risk question, and then turns to the investigation of possible
determinants of individual diﬀerences in risk attitudes.
3.1 Risk attitudes in a representative sample
Figure 1 describes the distribution of general risk attitudes in our sample. Each bar in the
histogram indicates the fraction of individuals choosing a given number on the eleven point
risk scale. The modal response is 5, but a substantial fraction of individuals answers in the
range between 2 and 8. There is also a notable mass, roughly 7 percent of all individuals,
who choose the extreme of 0, indicating a complete unwillingness to take risks. Only a
very small fraction chooses the other extreme of 10.
3.2 Exogenous Factors: Gender, Age, Height and Parental Education
Given that risk attitudes are heterogeneous, it is important to understand the determinants
of these individual diﬀerences. We investigate the impact of four personal characteristics
on risk attitudes: gender, age, height, and parental background. We focus on these char-
acteristics because they are plausibly exogenous to individual risk attitudes and behavior
and thus allow us to give a causal interpretation to correlations and regression results.6
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the diﬀerence between the fraction of women and
the fraction of men choosing each value on the general risk scale. Clearly, women are more
likely to choose low values on the scale and men are more likely to choose high values. The
ﬁgure thus gives an initial indication that women are less willing to take risks than men,
although this result is not yet conditioned on other potentially relevant characteristics.
Figure 2 displays the relationship between age and risk attitudes, with separate
panels for men and women. The shaded bands indicate the proportion of individuals at
each age who choose a given value on the 11-point risk scale. Starting at the bottom,
6 Note, however, the caveat that age could potentially be endogenous, for example if people who are less
willing to take risks live longer.
9the darkest shade shows the proportion choosing 0, indicating a complete unwillingness to
take risks. Progressively lighter shades correspond to choices 1 to 4, and the white band
corresponds to 5. Above the white band, progressively darker shades indicate choices 6 to
10.
Clearly, the proportion of individuals who are relatively unwilling to take risks, i.e.,
choose low values on the scale, increases strongly with age. For men, age appears to cause
a steady increase in the likelihood that an individual is unwilling to take risks. For women,
there is some indication that unwillingness to take risks increases more rapidly from the
late teens to age thirty, and then remains ﬂat, until it begins to increase again from the
mid-ﬁfties onwards. It is important to note that this relationship could reﬂect a direct
eﬀect of age on risk preferences, but could also be driven by cohort eﬀects, i.e., society-
wide changes in risk preferences over time, perhaps due to major historical events. The
diﬀerence in age patterns for men and women makes it less credible that the change in
risk attitudes is attributable to cohort eﬀects, because major historical events are likely to
aﬀect both men and women at the same time, but it is diﬃcult to deﬁnitively disentangle
the two explanations with the data available.
Comparing the panels for men and women, it appears that women are less willing
to take risks than men at all ages, although the gap narrows somewhat among the elderly.
Another noteworthy feature of Figure 2 is that the diﬀerently shaded bands track each
other quite closely over the entire age range. This suggests that aggregating the risk
measure from eleven categories to a smaller number of categories is likely to preserve most
of the information in the risk measure. This observation will lead us to adopt a simple,
binary classiﬁcation of risk attitudes in parts of the analysis later on.
Figure 3 presents histograms of responses to the general risk question by parental
education. Other aspects of family background could be relevant for risk attitudes, e.g.,
parental income, but only parental education is available in the data.7 As a proxy for
highly-educated parents, we use information on whether or not a parent passed the
“Abitur,” an exam that comes at the end of university-track high school in Germany
and is a prerequisite for attending university.8 The histograms in Figure 3 give some
7 It is likely that parental education captures some of the eﬀect of parental wealth and income.
8 There are two types of high school in Germany, vocational and college-track. Only about 30 percent
of students attend college-track high schools, and pass their Abitur, allowing them to attend college.
Thus, completion of an Abitur exam is an indicator of relatively high academic achievement.
10indication that family background does play a role in determining risk attitudes. The
mass in the histograms for individuals with highly-educated parents, shown in the bottom
panel, appears shifted to the right compared to histograms for individuals without highly-
educated parents, shown in the upper panel, indicating a positive correlation between
parental education and willingness to take risks.
Figure 4 presents histograms of responses to the general risk question by self-reported
height, again with separate panels for men and women. The ﬁgure shows that taller
individuals are more willing to take risks. This relationship is unconditional, and thus
could reﬂect correlation with other factors, in particular parental education. Highly-
educated parents might have higher income, provide better nutrition, and thus have taller
children.9 On the other hand, the result could reﬂect a direct eﬀect of height on willingness
to take risks, perhaps through a channel discussed recently in Persico et al. (2004). They
ﬁnd that individuals who are tall in their teenage years earn higher wages later in life,
even if they are the same height in adulthood. They hypothesize that this diﬀerence is
due to the impact of height in adolescence on conﬁdence and self-esteem. Our ﬁndings
suggest one channel through which the greater conﬁdence arising from height translates
into positive economic outcomes: increased willingness to take risks.
3.3 The Joint Role of Exogenous Determinants
To determine whether these unconditional results are robust once we control for all four
exogenous characteristics simultaneously, we turn to regression analysis. We estimate bi-
nary Probit models, where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if individuals are relatively
willing to take risks, i.e., choose a value greater than 5 on the risk scale. Likewise, a person
is classiﬁed as relatively unwilling to take risks if he or she chooses a value of 5 or lower
on the risk scale. We prefer using this binary measure, despite the fact that it neglects
some information contained in the ordinal structure, because it generates results that are
intuitive and simple to interpret, and minimizes problems arising from individual-speciﬁc
diﬀerences in the use of response scales.10 All estimation results report robust standard
9 Height is frequently used as an instrument for child nutrition and health in the development literature
see, e.g., Schultz (2002).
10 We ﬁnd similar results if we estimate Ordered Probit, or interval regression models, using a dependent
variable that reﬂects the full range of answers from 0 to 10. Thus we feel conﬁdent reporting the simpler,
more intuitive Probit results.
11errors, corrected for possible correlation of the error term across individuals from the same
household. The only sample restriction in the analysis is the omission of individuals who
have missing values for any of the variables in the regression.
Table 1 summarizes our initial regressions. The baseline speciﬁcation, presented
in Column (1), uses the four exogenous characteristics discussed above as explanatory
variables. The resulting coeﬃcient estimates show that the unconditional results remain
robust. Women are signiﬁcantly less willing to take risks in general. The probability
that someone is willing to take risks also decreases signiﬁcantly with age. Unreported
regressions that include age in splines with knots at 30 and 60 years reveal that the age
eﬀect is particularly strong for young and old ages, reﬂecting the patterns displayed in
Figure 2.11 The inclusion of splines leaves the estimates of the other coeﬃcients virtually
unchanged. Taller people are more likely to report that they are willing to take risks.
Finally, having a mother or father who is highly educated, in the sense of having completed
the Abitur, signiﬁcantly increases the probability that the individual is willing to take risks.
All of these eﬀects are individually and jointly signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.12
Columns (2) to (9) check the robustness of our ﬁndings by including other control
variables. The most important economic variables that need to be controlled for are mea-
sures for income and wealth. High income or wealth levels may increase the willingness
to take risks because they cushion the impact of bad outcomes. Individual wealth infor-
mation is taken from the 2002 wave of the SOEP, which contains detailed information on
diﬀerent assets and property values.13 Household wealth is constructed by summing the
wealth information of all individuals in the household.14 The yearly or monthly income
measures ask about income from a variety of sources, including retirement pensions, social
assistance, capital and labor income. We use income information from the 2003 as well as
from the 2004 wave. The former provides data on annual net income, while the latter has
11 Results for spline regressions are available upon request.
12 A likelihood-ratio test reveals that adding interaction terms between all independent variables improves
the ﬁt. The coeﬃcients of interest in the unrestricted speciﬁcation, however, are very similar to those
from the restricted model, both qualitatively and quantitatively. We prefer the model reported in
Column 1 of Table 1 for ease of presentation and interpretation, because, e.g., the coeﬃcient on the in-
teraction term between age and parental education might be driven by trends in educational achievement
over time.
13 The regression includes log individual wealth if wealth is positive (non-zero) and the absolute value of
individual wealth logged if wealth is negative (non-zero).
14 Adding household wealth increases the number of observations somewhat because of some missing values
for the individual wealth variable.
12data on current monthly gross income at the stage of the interview. A potential problem
with adding these variables to the regression is that they may be endogenous, e.g., a high
wealth level could lead to greater willingness to take risks, because it cushions the impact
of bad outcomes, but a greater willingness to take risks could also lead to high wealth lev-
els. Wealth and income are suﬃciently important economic variables, however, that it is
arguably important to know what happens to the baseline results when they are included
in the regression.
A comparison of the results in Columns (2) to (7) to results in Column (1) shows
that the coeﬃcient estimates are very robust to including the additional income and wealth
controls. The point estimates for gender, age, height and parental education are virtu-
ally unchanged, and remain equally statistically signiﬁcant, regardless of which wealth or
income measure is included in the regression. Although causal interpretations are inad-
visable, it is noteworthy that the correlation between wealth or income and risk attitudes
goes in the predicted direction, i.e., these coeﬃcients are invariably positive and signiﬁcant,
indicating that wealthier individuals are more willing to take risks.
As an additional robustness check, Columns (8) and (9) control for wealth and
income simultaneously, at the individual or household level, and also add a variety of other
personal and household characteristics. These characteristics, which are all potentially
endogenous, include among others: marital status, socialization in East or West Germany,
nationality, employment status (white collar, blue collar, private or public sector, self-
employed, non-participating), education, subjective health status, and religion. For the
sake of brevity, the table does not report coeﬃcient estimates for all of the additional
controls. The precise speciﬁcation and all coeﬃcients are shown in Table A.1 in the
Appendix. Once again, the point estimates and signiﬁcance levels for gender, age, and
height are virtually unchanged. The coeﬃcients for parental education are less robust.
Mother’s education is still signiﬁcant in Column (8), but becomes insigniﬁcant in Column
(9) where household income and wealth are included simultaneously. Father’s education
is not signiﬁcant in either column. This could reﬂect the correlation between parental
education and wealth, as well as the strong correlation between father’s education (and
occupation) and children’s occupational choice.
In summary, we ﬁnd that women are less willing to take risks than men,15 increasing
15 Gender diﬀerences have often been studied using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition techniques, which are
13age leads to decreasing willingness to take risks, and increasing height leads to a greater
willingness to take risks. These ﬁndings are robust in all speciﬁcations. Having a mother
who completed the Abitur increases the likelihood that an individual is willing to take
risks, although in one speciﬁcation this eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. The impact of father’s
education is less robust, with an insigniﬁcant eﬀect in two speciﬁcations, but otherwise
seems to cause an increased willingness to take risks.
4 Experimental Validation of Survey Measures
The previous section identiﬁed several exogenous factors that determine individual risk
attitudes. Importantly, these conclusions were drawn from a very large and representative
survey. The scope of the results is therefore considerably larger than that of the typical
laboratory experiment, which uses a small and selective subject pool of undergraduate
students. Even the recently conducted ﬁeld experiment by Harrison et al. (2003) relies on
a subject pool of only 253 subjects. While their study makes an important contribution to
the literature by studying behavior of a non-student subject pool, their data do not allow
an analysis as detailed as the one that is possible with data based on 22,000 individuals.
On the other hand, all results in the previous section are based on survey responses,
not on actual behavior. A serious concern with the use of hypothetical questions is that
they might not predict actual behavior. Put diﬀerently, it is unclear to what extent the
general risk question is a reliable indicator for real risk taking behavior. Since survey
responses are not incentive compatible, it may well be that respondents give inaccurate
answers, perhaps due to strategic considerations, self-serving biases, or a lack of attention.
In a related paper on social preferences, Glaeser et al. (2000) have shown that attitudinal
trust questions do not predict actual trusting behavior in controlled and paid experiments.
Overall, the evidence on the reliability of survey measures is an unresolved issue and
there continues to be considerable debate over how accurate hypothetical questions really
are, and in what circumstances they are likely to perform reasonably well (Camerer and
more ﬂexible than regression analysis because they allow gender to interact with all observable charac-
teristics. Speciﬁcally, the technique decomposes the diﬀerence in risk attitudes across gender into two
diﬀerent components, one due to diﬀerences in observable characteristics and the other due to diﬀer-
ences in regression coeﬃcients. Performing this decomposition we ﬁnd that more than 60 percent of
the gender gap is explained by diﬀerences in coeﬃcients rather than characteristics, regardless of the
speciﬁcation or the reference group chosen. This provides a further conﬁrmation that women are less
willing to take risks, even if they have the same observable characteristics as men.
14Hogarth, 1999; Kraus, 1995).
In light of this discussion, the researcher who is interested in an accurate and yet
representative measurement of preferences faces a dilemma. Running an experiment with,
say, 22,000 subjects is hardly a feasible option, given the substantial associated adminis-
trative and ﬁnancial costs. Conducting surveys or experiments with only several hundred
subjects, on the other hand, leaves the researcher either with uncertainty about the re-
liability of the data or a relatively small sample with limited statistical power. In this
paper we suggest a solution to this dilemma: the combination of a large survey with ﬁeld
experiments designed to validate the survey measures. The primary methodological point
of this paper is that experiments can be used to validate survey measures to end up with
both statistical power and conﬁdence in the reliability of the measures. In order to validate
our survey risk measure, we ran a lottery experiment based on a representative sample
of adult individuals living in Germany. Of course, it would also be possible to validate
the measure in a lab experiment with undergraduates, a relatively easy and potentially
less expensive option. Strictly speaking, however, this would only allow validation of the
survey questions for this special subgroup of the total population, which is why we decided
on our alternative design.
In our ﬁeld experiment, the subjects are a random sample of the population drawn
using the random walk method (Fowler, 1988).16 The survey-experiment was conducted by
experienced and trained interviewers who interviewed subjects face-to-face at the subjects’
homes. Both answers to the questionnaire and the decisions in the lottery experiment were
typed into a computer (Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI)). The study was
run between June 9th and July 4th, 2005, and a total of 450 participants took part.
In our study, subjects ﬁrst went through a detailed questionnaire, similar to the
standard SOEP questionnaire. As part of the questionnaire we asked the general risk
question analyzed in the previous section. After completion of the questionnaire, partici-
pants took part in a paid lottery experiment. In the experiment participants were shown
a table with 20 rows. In each row they had to decide whether they preferred a safe option
or playing a lottery. In the lottery they could win either 300 Euros or 0 Euros with 50
percent probability (1 Euro ∼ $ US 1.2). In each row the lottery was exactly the same but
16 For each of 179 randomly chosen primary sampling units (voting districts), one trained interviewer
was given a randomly chosen starting address. Starting at that speciﬁc local address, the interviewer
contacted every third household and had to motivate one adult person aged 16 or older to participate.
15the safe option increased from row to row. In the ﬁrst row the safe option was 0 Euros, in
the second it was 10 Euros, and so on up to 190 Euros in row 20. After a participant had
made a decision for each row, it was randomly determined which row became relevant for
the participant’s payoﬀ. For example, if row 4 was randomly selected, the subject either
received 40 Euros in case he had opted for the safe option in that row, or received the
outcome from the lottery if he had chosen to play the lottery. This procedure guarantees
that each decision was incentive compatible (see also Holt and Laury, 2002, who have
used a similar procedure). Once a respondent preferred the safe option to playing the
lottery, the interviewer conﬁrmed that he would also prefer even higher safe payments to
playing the lottery. If subjects have monotonous preferences, they prefer the lottery up
to a certain level of the safe option, and then switch to preferring the safe option in all
subsequent rows of the choice table. The switching point informs us about a subject’s risk
attitude. Since the expected value of the lottery is 150 Euros, weakly risk averse subjects
should prefer safe options that are smaller than or equal to 150 Euros over the lottery.
Only risk loving subjects should opt for the lottery when the oﬀered safe option is greater
than 150 Euros.
The stakes in this experiment are relatively high compared to typical lab experi-
ments. However, not every subject in the experiment was paid. Subjects were informed
that after the experiment a random device would determine whether they would be paid
according to their decision, and that the chance of winning was 1/7. Subjects were paid
by check sent to them by mail.
Ideally subjects who take part in the experiment should be as similar as possible to
the participants in the SOEP study, in particular with respect to the exogenous factors
that explain individual risk attitudes. As the upper panel of Table 2 shows, they are in fact
very similar. The fraction of females is 52.7 percent in the experiment and 51.9 percent
in the SOEP data. Also, both mean age and median age of the participants are extremely
similar. The same holds for height. The similarity reﬂects the true representative character
of the experimental subject pool. Table 2 also shows that the mean and median response to
the general risk question is very similar. While the mean (median) value in the experiment
is 4.76 (5), it is 4.42 (5) for the people who are interviewed in the SOEP. In addition the
answers to the general risk question are almost identically distributed (compare Figure 1
16and Figure 5, upper panel).17
Figure 5 shows a histogram of subjects’ choices in the experiment. About 78 percent
of the participants are risk averse, in the sense that they prefer not to play the lottery,
which has an expected value of 150 Euros, when oﬀered a safe payment smaller than 150
Euros. About 13 percent are arguably risk neutral: 9 percent prefer a safe payment of
150 Euros to the lottery, but play the lottery at smaller alternative options, and 4 percent
play the lottery when oﬀered a safe payment equal to the expected value of the lottery but
do not play the lottery when the safe payment exceeds the expected value of the lottery.
About 9 percent of the subjects reveal risk loving preferences, preferring the lottery to
safe amounts above 150 Euros.
Our main interest in this section is whether survey data can predict actual risk
taking behavior in the lottery experiment. In other words, we want to study whether
subjects who indicated a greater willingness to take risks in the general risk question also
show a greater willingness to take risks in the lottery experiment. A ﬁrst indication that
this is indeed the case is given by the lower panel of Figure 5. The ﬁgure shows a scatter
plot where the average certainty equivalents observed in the experiment, i.e. the average
of the smallest safe options that the corresponding subjects preferred over the lottery, are
plotted against the survey answers. The ﬁgure reveals a clearly positive relation.18 To test
the predictive power of the general risk question more rigorously, we ran the regressions
reported in the lower panel of Table 2. In the ﬁrst model, we simply regress answers
given to the general risk question on the value of the safe option at the switching point.
The general risk coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at any conventional level indicating
that the answers given in the survey do predict actual risk taking behavior. To check
robustness, we add controls in Columns 2 and 3, which are essentially the same as the
controls in Table 1. In Column 2 we add gender, age, and height as explanatory variables.
In Column 3, we control for many additional individual characteristics such as wealth, debt,
household income, marital status, number of dependent children, country of residence
before uniﬁcation, foreigner status, schooling degree, employment status, occupational
choice, employment rank, public and private sector employment, life satisfaction, general
17 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test does not reject the null hypothesis that the answers to the survey risk
questions in the two samples have the same distribution.
18 For the calculation of the average value of the switching point we set the value of the safe option equal
to 200 for the 31 participants who always prefer the lottery.
17health status, smoking, and weight. The general risk coeﬃcient becomes somewhat smaller
but stays signiﬁcant at the one percent level. In sum, the answers to the general risk
attitude question predict actual behavior in the lottery quite well. With a high level of
conﬁdence we can therefore reject the hypothesis that our survey measure is behaviorally
irrelevant.
5 A Lottery Measure of Risk Preference: The Hypothetical
Investment Question
It is important to compare our ﬁndings based on the general risk measure to our more-
standard, lottery measure of risk preference. In this section we return to the issues of
heterogeneity and exogenous determinants of risk attitudes, but use investment choices in
the hypothetical investment scenario as the measure of willingness to take risks. We also
show how, under speciﬁc assumptions, responses to the investment question can be used
to recover a parameter value describing the curvature of the individual’s utility function.
5.1 Risk Attitudes in a Hypothetical Lottery
Respondents in the SOEP were asked how much of 100,000 Euros in lottery winnings they
would choose to invest, in a hypothetical asset promising, with equal probability, to either
halve or double their investment in two years time. The question oﬀered respondents
six possible investment amounts: 0, 20,000, 40,000, 60,000, 80,000, or 100,000 Euros.
Importantly, these stakes are large enough to have a potentially signiﬁcant impact on
lifetime utility; 100,000 Euros is roughly ﬁve times the average annual net individual
income of respondents in the sample (21,524 Euros). One feature of the question that
deserves additional comment is the two-year lag between the time of investment and the
hypothetical payoﬀ. On the one hand this feature is necessary to create the context of a
realistic investment. On the other hand there is a potential confound, because diﬀerences
in the investment decision could reﬂect diﬀerences in time preference rather than risk
preference. In Dohmen et al. (2005b) we analyze data from a ﬁeld experiment, in which
we elicit time preferences as well as questionnaire answers to the general risk question
discussed above. It turns out that the correlation between elicited time preferences and
stated risk preferences is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We therefore neglect the
18potential confound of time preferences in the following analysis of the investment question.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of responses to the investment question in the sample.
The histogram indicates that roughly 60 percent of the survey respondents chose not to
invest in the hypothetical asset.19 The remaining 40 percent did choose to invest, with
substantial variation in terms of the amount, although the fraction of individuals investing
decreases as the investment amount becomes larger. Thus, similar to the general risk
question, the hypothetical investment measure reveals substantial heterogeneity. In fact,
the correlation between investment choices and responses to the general risk question is
fairly strong, about 0.26, indicating a signiﬁcant overlap in terms of what these questions
measure.
In order to explore the determinants of individual diﬀerences in willingness to invest,
we regress the amount invested in the lottery on exogenous factors and other controls. The
resulting coeﬃcient estimates are presented in Table 3. We do not adopt a binary measure
for the dependent variable, as we did in the case of the general risk question, because it
is more diﬃcult to choose a sensible division of the scale. Also, we want our coeﬃcient
estimates to reﬂect the impact of exogenous factors on the amount of Euros invested.20
We use an estimation procedure that accounts for the fact that the dependent variable is
measured in intervals, and hence is left and right censored. A negative coeﬃcient indicates
a lower willingness to invest and therefore a lower willingness to take risks.
In Table 3, the right-hand side variables for Columns (1) to (9) correspond exactly
to those used in the analysis of the general risk question, in Table 1. The baseline results,
without income, wealth and additional controls, are shown in Column (1). The marginal
eﬀects indicate that women invest about 6000 Euros less in the risky asset than men. Each
year of age tends to reduce the investment by about 350 Euros.21 Finally, each centimeter
of height leads to about 200 Euros higher investment in the risky asset. These eﬀects are
substantial, and they are all highly signiﬁcant. They are also qualitatively similar to the
ﬁndings based on the general risk question. In contrast, the results for parental education
19 A similar share of the sample, roughly 68 percent, chose a value less than 6 on the general risk scale and
were classiﬁed as relatively unwilling to take risks using the binary version of the general risk question.
20 As a robustness check, we estimated the regressions using a binary measure as the dependent variable,
indicating whether an individual invests a positive amount. We found very similar results in this case.
21 A speciﬁcation with three splines with knots at 30 and 60 years reveals that age has no signiﬁcant eﬀect
on investment for the youngest age category, signiﬁcant and large eﬀects of 300 and 640 Euros per year
of age, respectively, for the two older age categories.
19are somewhat diﬀerent. Mother’s education has no explanatory power for investment
choices, and father’s education exhibits a large and highly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
willingness to invest. Adding additional controls in Columns (2) to (9) leaves these results
qualitatively unchanged.
These ﬁndings are noteworthy given that the hypothetical investment question in-
volves a relatively concrete context, in terms of a legitimate investment opportunity. For
instance, the gender eﬀect we ﬁnd contrasts with Schubert et al. (1999), who conduct lot-
tery experiments with undergraduates, and ﬁnd that gender diﬀerences become insigniﬁ-
cant when lotteries are given concrete framing as investment opportunities. In Section 6
we explore the issue of context in more detail.
5.2 Implied Coeﬃcients of Risk Aversion
Responses to the hypothetical investment question provide cardinal information on in-
dividuals’ relative willingness to take risks, i.e., diﬀerences in investment choices can be
measured in Euros. Under certain assumptions, this information can be combined with a
measure of individual wealth and converted into a measure of the degree of curvature of
the utility function.
We assume that the individual’s utility function is characterized by constant relative
risk aversion, an assumption that is commonly made in many economic applications due to
its tractability.22 Given this assumption, an individual’s utility has the form u(x)=x1−γ
1−γ ,
which is a function of a wealth endowment (or consumption possibilities) x. The CRRA
parameter γ describes the degree of relative risk aversion for an individual: the individual
is risk loving if γ<0, risk neutral if γ = 0, and risk averse if γ>0.23 Using an individ-
ual’s investment choice, and additional survey information on the individual’s wealth level
before the investment, it is possible to compute an interval for the individual’s CRRA
parameter.24 Intuitively, the choice of a given investment implies that the expected utility
from this option must be greater than or equal to the utility derived from any other option,
22 We choose this speciﬁcation for reasons of tractability and because it is frequently used in the literature.
Note, however, that empirical evidence suggests skepticism about the appropriateness of this functional
form (see Gollier, 2001, p. 58).
23 Note that limγ→1 u(x)=l nx.
24 Note that heterogeneity in the initial wealth level implies that individuals with the same answer to the
investment question may have diﬀerent CRRA intervals.
20in particular the next largest, and next smallest possible investment choice. Expressing
these two conditions in terms of the individual’s utility function, and substituting the
wealth level as an argument, it is possible to solve for upper and lower bound values for
γ>0 (see Barsky et al., 1997, and Holt and Laury, 2002, for a similar approach). Given
that the stakes in our hypothetical investment scenario are large enough to be meaningful
in terms of lifetime consumption, and given that the calculation incorporates information
on current wealth, the resulting parameter ranges can be interpreted as referring to the
curvature of the lifetime utility function.25
The top panel of Figure 7 shows the distribution of interval mid-points in the sample.
The ﬁgure excludes individuals investing 0 Euros or 100,000 Euros. Individuals who invest
nothing are clearly risk averse, but the interval for their CRRA coeﬃcient cannot be
displayed in the graph because it is not bounded from above. Conversely, individuals who
invest 100,000 Euros are relatively risk-seeking, but the lower bound for their interval
cannot be determined.26 In the literature, values for the CRRA coeﬃcient between 1 and
5 are typically perceived as reasonable, and values above 10 are considered unrealistic
(for discussions on this point see Kocherlakota, 1996; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Gollier, 2001,
p. 31). The conditional distribution in Figure 7 is consistent with this perception: the
bulk of the mass in the distribution is located between 1 and 10. There is, however, a
non-negligible mass of midpoints in the range of higher values, up to about 20.27
The middle panel of Figure 7 provides a diﬀerent perspective on the data. It shows
the cumulative distributions of lower and upper bounds for γ in the population (the cu-
mulative for upper bounds is the lower line in the ﬁgure), excluding individuals who invest
25 Unlike Barsky et al. (1997) or Holt and Laury (2002), our calculation takes into account current wealth
levels (including the 100,000 Euros of hypothetical endowment). Guiso and Paiella (2005) take a diﬀer-
ent approach altogether. They derive a point estimate for the degree of absolute risk aversion using a
local approximation of the utility function around imputed lifetime wealth. As noted by the authors,
this approximation is only reasonable for an investment with relatively small stakes, like the one in-
cluded in their survey. The much larger stakes in our hypothetical investment question make such an
approximation inadvisable. Indeed, computations of CRRA coeﬃcients for the SOEP sample using a
local approximation of the utility function yield exceedingly high levels of risk aversion compared to the
interval approach depicted in Figure 7. Donkers et al. (2001) also calculate preference parameters using
lottery responses, but in a model derived from cumulative prospect theory rather than in the expected
utility framework.
26 Thus the investment question does not allow us to say whether individuals investing 100,00 are mildly
risk averse, with a γ close to 0, or whether they are actually risk loving, with γ<0.
27 This is potentially explained by measurement error in wealth levels, the neglect of incomes in the
computation, or the underestimation of the true expected value of the lottery because of probability-
weighting.
210 or 100,000 Euros. For any given value of γ on the horizontal axis, the vertical diﬀerence
between the two curves gives the fraction of individuals with an interval containing that
value of γ. The ﬁgure conﬁrms that most intervals contain a γ between 1 and 10. The
bottom panel in the ﬁgure shows the cumulative distributions for upper and lower bounds
of γ using the whole sample including non-investors and individuals investing the the full
amount of 100,000 Euros. Since γ cannot be bounded from a above for the 61 percent
of individuals investing zero, the cumulative distribution converges to 39 percent in the
range of values for γ on the horizontal axis. Likewise, γ cannot be bounded from below
for those who invest the full amount.
In principle, it would also be possible to construct a distribution of CRRA coeﬃ-
cients using the lottery choices in our ﬁeld experiment, described in Section 4. However,
the lottery measure is not as well-suited for this purpose, because the stakes are relatively
small (300 Euros). As shown by Rabin (2000), the curvature of the lifetime utility func-
tion should be approximately linear for stakes in this range, assuming a typical wealth
level.28 In order to avoid inferring extreme parameter values from such lottery choices, it
is typically necessary to assume an initial wealth level of zero (Watt et al., 2002). This
assumption need not be taken literally, but could instead capture the somewhat more
realistic notion that the individual “ignores” current wealth when making their decisions.
If we do assume a wealth level of zero, as is done by, e.g., Holt and Laury (2002) and Har-
rison et al. (2003), indiﬀerence between the lottery of winning 300 Euros or 0 Euros with
equal probability p =0 .5 and a safe option of y implies p · 3001−γ
1−γ =
y1−γ
1−γ , and therefore
γ =1−
lnp
lny−ln300. This gives bounds for the interval containing γ. It is then possible to
assign an interval to each of the switching points observed in the ﬁeld experiment (dis-
played in Figure 5). The CRRA coeﬃcients associated with each switching point, (y,γ)a r e
(0,∞), (10,0.796), (20,0.744), (30,0.699), (40,0.656), (50,0.613), (60,0.569), (70,0.524),
(80,0.476), (90,0.424), (100,0.369), (110,0.309), (120,0.244), (130,0.171), (140,0.091),
(150,0), (160,−0.103), (170,−0.220), (180,−0.357), (190,−0.518).
It would be valuable to be able to interpret responses to the general risk question in
terms of coeﬃcient intervals. In this case researchers could take advantage of the relatively
simple and easy-to-ask format of the general risk question without sacriﬁcing the ability
28 In fact, if we use the information on wealth and income included in the ﬁeld experiment and calculate
CRRA intervals as in the SOEP, we obtain extreme coeﬃcient estimates (available upon request) by
this procedure.
22to gather information on preference parameters. We conclude this section by showing
how the SOEP data can be used to construct the necessary mapping. Figure 8 shows
the average amount invested in the risky asset for each possible answer to the general
risk question, among all individuals and also separately for men and women. This is the
information necessary for the ﬁrst step in imputing ranges for the CRRA coeﬃcient based
on responses to the general risk question. To see how the imputation works, suppose an
individual reports a willingness to take risks of 4 on the general risk scale. According to the
ﬁgure, individuals with such a response invest on average 13,184 Euros in the hypothetical
investment. Combining this information with data on the individual’s wealth endowment,
say 25,000 Euros, straightforward computation leads to a CRRA coeﬃcient for this person
of around 4.5. Alternatively, suppose a man with a wealth endowment of 100,000 Euros
reports a willingness to take risks of 7. On average, he would invest 22,716 Euros in the
risky asset, implying a CRRA coeﬃcient of about 4.1. Finally, the CRRA coeﬃcient of
a woman endowed with 30,000 Euros of wealth, choosing a value of 2 on the general risk
scale, is predicted to be around around 7.55, using the information that women reporting a
value of 2 invest on average 8,064 Euros into the hypothetical asset. The type of mapping
illustrated in Figure 8 is thus a potentially useful tool, adding to the value of the general
risk question for researchers who prefer the question’s easy-to-ask format but who are also
interested in CRRA coeﬃcients.
In summary, results on heterogeneity and determinants using the hypothetical lot-
tery question are similar to those obtained using the general risk question. Given that
the investment scenario holds risk perceptions constant, however, these eﬀects are more
clearly attributable to diﬀerences in risk preference.29 These ﬁndings are also noteworthy
because they persist even though the question incorporates concrete context, in the form
of a legitimate investment opportunity. The estimates for CRRA parameters provide in-
formation about the distribution of risk preferences in the population, and the mapping
provided at the end of the section potentially adds to the value of the general risk question.
29 Note, however, previous evidence on gender diﬀerences in probability-weighting. For example, Fehr-
Duda et al. (2004) conduct an experiment on risky choice, involving explicit stakes and probabilities,
and ﬁnd evidence for a gender diﬀerence in willingness to take risks that is due to diﬀerent perceptions
of how “large” or “small” the probabilities are. Donkers et al. (2001) also ﬁnd evidence that individual
heterogeneity is partly explained by diﬀerences in probability-weighting.
236 Risk Attitudes and Context
This section investigates the role of context in shaping risk attitudes. In economics it
is standard to assume the existence of a single risk preference governing risk taking in
all contexts. In line with this assumption, economists typically use a lottery measure of
risk preference, framed as a ﬁnancial decision, as an indicator of risk attitudes in all other
contexts. By contrast, there is considerable controversy on this point in psychology. Based
on laboratory experiments in which self-reported risk taking is only weakly correlated
across diﬀerent contexts, some studies conclude that a stable risk trait does not exist at
all (see Slovic, 1972a and 1972b for a review). We contribute to this discussion in several
ways. First, we study the impact of context on a much larger scale using a representative
sample. Second, we measure the correlation of willingness to take risks across the diﬀerent
contexts identiﬁed in the SOEP: general, car driving, ﬁnancial matters, sports and leisure,
health, and career. Little or no correlation would provide evidence against the standard
assumption; a strong correlation would suggest the existence of a stable risk preference.
We then explore the determinants of willingness to take risks in speciﬁc contexts. Evidence
that the same factors determine risk attitudes across contexts would also lend support to
the notion of a stable risk preference.
6.1 Correlation Across Domains
The ﬁrst section of Table 4 reports mean responses for each domain-speciﬁc question and
the general risk question.30 Context appears to matter for self-reported willingness to take
risks. The ranking in willingness to take risks, from greatest to least, is as follows: general,
career, sports and leisure, car driving, health, and ﬁnancial matters. The same ranking
holds for both men and women. Notably, women are less willing to take risks than men
in every domain.
The next section in the table shows simple pairwise correlations between individuals’
risk attitudes in diﬀerent contexts. Risk attitudes are not perfectly correlated across
domains, but the correlations are large, typically in the neighborhood of 0.5, and all are
highly signiﬁcant. Another way of assessing the stability of risk attitudes is to check
30 The diﬀerent numbers of observations across domains reﬂects diﬀerent non-response rates. These dif-
ferences may arise because individuals feel certain questions do not apply to them, e.g., a 90-year-old
without a driver’s license is free to leave blank the question about taking risks while driving a car.
24what fraction of individuals is relatively willing to take risks (choose a value greater than
5) for all of the six diﬀerent measures. It turns out that 51 percent of individuals are
willing to take risks in all six domains and more than 1 third are willing in at least
ﬁve domains. The relatively large correlation across contexts, and the stability of an
individual’s disposition towards risk across domains, strongly suggest the presence of a
stable, underlying risk preference. The consistency across domains is not perfect, and
could indicate some malleability of risk preferences, but it seems more likely that this
variation reﬂects the risk perception component of the measures, e.g. a tendency for most
people to view car driving as more risky than sports and thus state a relatively lower
willingness to take risks in car driving.31
The lower portion of Table 4 reports similar statistics, but using binary versions
of each question. These are constructed in the same way as the binary version of the
general risk question used in Section 3: for each domain, the indicator is equal to 1 for
responses higher than 5 on the question scale and 0 otherwise. The means of these binary
risk measures can be interpreted as the fraction of individuals in each domain who are
relatively willing to take risks. The correlations across domains using the binary measures
range from 0.24 to 0.47 and are highly signiﬁcant.
Principal components analysis using the general risk question and the ﬁve domain-
speciﬁc questions tells a similar story. About 60 percent of the variation in individual
risk attitudes is explained by one principal component, consistent with the existence of a
single underlying trait determining willingness to take risks.32 Nevertheless, each of the
other ﬁve components explains at least ﬁve percent of the variation, which again suggests
that there is some additional content captured by the domain-speciﬁc measures.
31 Given that the questions ask about ”willingness to take risks,” it is possible that individuals could think
of the same gamble, in utility terms, across contexts, in which case any variation at all in willingness
to take risks would be inconsistent with stable risk preferences. It seems more likely, however, that
individuals imagine the typical risk they expect to encounter in each context, based on their subjective
beliefs, and state their willingness to take this risk. In this case, the pattern we observe would reﬂect a
stable risk preference but varying risk perceptions.
32 The eigenvalue associated with this component equals 3.61 while the eigenvalues associated with all
other components are smaller than 0.57. When only one component is retained, none of the oﬀ-diagonal
elements of the residual correlation matrix exceeds |0.11|.
256.2 Determinants of Risk Attitudes in Diﬀerent Domains
Table 5 explores the determinants of individual risk attitudes in each of the ﬁve domains
identiﬁed in the SOEP. For ease of comparison, the ﬁrst column reports results for the
general risk domain, shown previously in Table 1. The remaining columns report marginal
eﬀect estimates from Probit regressions, where the dependent variables are the binary
versions of each domain-speciﬁc question.33 These binary measures are the same as the
ones reported in the lower section of Table 4 above, with a 1 indicating that an individual
is relatively willing to take risks (i.e., chooses a value greater than 5 on the response scale).
From Columns (2) to (9) it is apparent that the impact of the exogenous factors
is, for the most part, qualitatively similar across contexts. Women are signiﬁcantly less
willing to take risks than men in all domains.34 Gender diﬀerences are most pronounced
for general risk attitudes and risk attitudes in car driving, and least pronounced in the
domains of ﬁnancial matters and health. Age decreases the probability that an individual
is willing to take risks in all ﬁve domains, but has a particularly large impact in the domain
of sports and leisure, and a relatively small impact in ﬁnancial matters. The table also
shows that taller persons are more willing to take risks, in all domains. The height eﬀect
is particularly strong for general risk attitudes, the career domain, and in the domain of
sports and leisure.35 The relationship between parental education and risk attitudes is
less consistent across domains. Overall, having a parent who has completed the Abitur
increases willingness to take risks. A more highly-educated mother is associated with a
higher willingness to take risks in all domains, except for car driving and health. This holds
similarly for subjects with more highly-educated fathers. Adding additional controls to the
regressions has no impact on the qualitative results, and most eﬀects remain signiﬁcant.
Regressions with all controls are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix.36
In summary, our ﬁndings suggest the existence of a stable, underlying risk prefer-
33 The results are robust if we instead run linear probability models (OLS) or ordered probits, using the
11-point scale measures rather than binary measures as dependent variables.
34 A Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition reveals that across domains, more than 60 to 70 percent of this dif-
ference is driven by diﬀerences in the risk coeﬃcients, rather than diﬀerent observable characteristics.
This result is robust when adding the full set of controls.
35 In OLS regressions, with the 11-point measure as dependent variables, height matters even more in the
career domain than in the general or sports and leisure domains.
36 The coeﬃcient estimates are virtually identical in speciﬁcations using age splines with knots at 30 and
60 years of age, and are available upon request.
26ence. One source of evidence is the strong correlation of risk attitudes across contexts,
and the ﬁnding that a single principal component explains the bulk the variation in risk
attitudes. Another piece of evidence is the fact that risk attitudes have similar determi-
nants in all contexts, in the form of the four exogenous factors. There is some variation
in risk attitudes with respect to context, but this seems likely to reﬂect variation in risk
perceptions across contexts. Diﬀerences in risk perception could also potentially explain
why the exogenous factors have eﬀects of varying magnitudes across contexts, but a more
detailed investigation of why, e.g., the gender eﬀect is stronger in some contexts than
others could be an interesting subject for future research.
7 The Predictive Power of the Survey Risk Measures
So far we have primarily concentrated on the heterogeneity and determinants of individual
risk attitudes. In this ﬁnal portion of the analysis we take a diﬀerent perspective and
ask whether the survey measures are capable of predicting actual risk taking behavior.
Previously we demonstrated the ability of the general risk measure to predict real-stakes
lottery choices in a ﬁeld experiment, but in this section we study a broader range of risky
behaviors, encompassing a variety of important economic and social contexts, and test the
validity of all seven risk measures. In so doing, we hope to answer two questions. First, do
all of the survey instruments reliably predict risky behavior, despite the fact that they are
not incentive compatible and are therefore potentially behaviorally irrelevant? The answer
to this question is of great importance both from a methodological and a practical point of
view. Second, how do the diﬀerent risk measures compare in terms of predictive power? In
particular, how do the alternative measures fare, compared to the more standard measure
of risk preference, and how do context-speciﬁc measures perform within and outside of their
corresponding context? For example, is smoking best predicted by a health related risk
question or is it equally well explained by a general risk or hypothetical lottery question?
In the past economists have typically used only a single question, most often a hypothetical
lottery question, to predict risk taking behavior in all contexts. Barsky et al. (1997) and
Guiso and Paiella (2005), e.g., study the impact of risk attitudes on risky behaviors,
but use only a single measure of risk attitudes, corresponding closely to our hypothetical
investment measure. We test the relative predictive power of all of our seven risk measures
27and in so doing learn something about the potential value-added of using the general risk
question, and domain-speciﬁc risk measures, versus using the more standard hypothetical
lottery measure. One caveat to the analysis in this section is that some of the behaviors
may in fact be endogenous with respect to risk attitudes. For instance, smoking aﬀects
overall health and reduces mean life expectancy, which aﬀects lifetime income and could
thus potentially change risk attitudes. However, even taking the most conservative stance
and refraining from causal interpretation entirely, assessing whether the measures are
signiﬁcantly correlated with behavior is interesting in its own right.
To address our questions, we use a collection of behaviors reported by the SOEP
participants that spans diﬀerent risk domains, i.e., willingness to take risks in general, in
car driving, in ﬁnancial matters, in sports and leisure, career, and health. The speciﬁc
behaviors include portfolio choices, participation in sports, occupational choice, smoking,
migration, life satisfaction and traﬃc oﬀenses. All of these risky behaviors are measured
as binary variables and are displayed in Table 6, with the exception of life satisfaction,
which is measured on an 11-point scale, and traﬃc oﬀenses, which are analyzed separately.
As a proxy for portfolio choice we use information about household stock holdings, shown
in Column 1. The variable “Investment in Stocks” is equal to 1 if at least one house-
hold member holds stocks, shares or stock options and zero otherwise. Since the question
about stock holdings is typically answered by the household head, we use observations
on risk preferences of household heads in Column (1) only. In the context of sports,
the variable “Active Sports” takes a value of 1 if an individual actively participates in
any sports (at least once per month). The variables “Employment in Public Sector” and
“Self-Employment” are binary variables equal to 1 in the case of public sector employment
or self-employment, respectively. These two career choices are interesting because public
sector employment is relatively risk-free, in terms of income variability and job security,
whereas self-employment is a relatively risky career. To study risk-taking behavior in the
domain of health, we use information about whether the SOEP participant smokes or not.
The corresponding variable is equal to 1 if the respondent smokes. Migration is another
interesting risky behavior. The fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 oﬀers a natural experiment
for studying the determinants of migration behavior for East and West Germany. The
relatively attractive economic situation in West Germany was clearly an important factor
in migration decisions following reuniﬁcation, but risk attitudes are also likely to have
28played a signiﬁcant role, given that moving between East and West Germany was asso-
ciated with substantial uncertainty regarding labor-market prospects, social acceptance,
etc. The variables “Mobility from East to West” and “Mobility from West to East” are
binary variables taking the value of 1 if the respondent has moved (after the year 1989)
from East to West, or from West to East, respectively. A ﬁnal outcome that might be
associated with general risk attitudes is “Overall Life Satisfaction”, which is measured on
an 11-point scale in the SOEP (higher values represent higher life satisfaction).
Each reported coeﬃcient estimate shown in Table 6 is based on a separate regression
of the respective behavior on this particular risk measure and a set of controls. Coeﬃcient
estimates for the controls are not reported but are available on request. In every regression
the controls include gender, age, height, and parental education, as in Column (1) of Table
1, but also log household wealth, log household debt, and the log of current gross monthly
household income. In addition, we control for the number of household members older
than 18 in the regression for stock holdings, shown in Column (1), because the likelihood
that at least one person in the household holds risky assets increases with household
size. In Columns (6) to (8) we add additional controls as explained in the notes to Table
6. All risk measures are coded as binary measures, so that coeﬃcients are comparable,
including the hypothetical investment question: The variable “Positive Amount Invested in
Hypothetical Asset” is equal to “0” if individuals invest nothing in the asset and “1” if they
invest a positive amount.37 For the outcomes in Columns (1) to (7), which are measured as
binary variables, we ran Probit regressions. For each behavioral outcome Table 6 displays
the Probit marginal eﬀects estimates, evaluated at the means of independent variables.
The coeﬃcients of the binary risk measures reﬂect the discrete change in the probability.
OLS estimates are displayed in Column (8). In addition, we report the standard errors of
the coeﬃcients (in brackets) as well as the log likelihoods (in parentheses). For example,
the three entries in the upper left corner in Column (1) say that the willingness to take
risks in general is signiﬁcantly correlated with investments in stocks, the marginal eﬀect
being 0.035. The standard error of the coeﬃcient is 0.011 and the log likelihood for this
regression is -4708.9.
Several important observations can be made from Table 6. First, all measures predict
37 Our qualitative results do not depend on the use of a binary measure for the hypothetical asset. For
instance, the measure still does not predict smoking, self-employment, or mobility if we instead use the
full range of investment choices as the independent variable.
29at least some of the behaviors, providing further conﬁrmation of their behavioral validity.
This holds in particular for the general risk measure (ﬁrst row). This measure is the only
measure that predicts all behaviors signiﬁcantly and with the expected sign. Notably, it
predicts considerably better than the hypothetical lottery question (second row), which is
not signiﬁcantly correlated with the decision to be self-employed, to smoke, or to migrate.
Second, each context-speciﬁc risk question predicts behavior in its respective domain, and
is by far the best predictor in this domain. This can been seen by comparing the size of
the coeﬃcients and the log likelihoods of the diﬀerent regressions.
Investment in stocks, shown in Column (1), is positively correlated with several risk
measures, as expected given the relative riskiness of this kind of ﬁnancial investment. The
best predictor is the domain-speciﬁc risk question on “Financial Matters:” the marginal
eﬀect for this measure is the largest, and the log likelihood for this regression is larger
than for any other regression based on a diﬀerent risk measure. Being active in sports is
strongly correlated with several risk measures but the measure of risk taking in “Sports
and Leisure” is the best predictor (see Column (2)).
In Columns (3) and (4) we investigate the relationship between risk attitudes and ca-
reer choice. Given the high degree of job security and the low income variability associated
with public employment, we would expect that relatively risk-averse people are attracted
by the public sector. In fact, the coeﬃcients on willingness to take risks in general, and in
career, are signiﬁcant and negative, consistent with this prediction. It is noteworthy that
the coeﬃcient of the hypothetical investment question, shown in the second row, is signiﬁ-
cantly positive. In our view this is a rather implausible result, highlighting potential limits
of using hypothetical lottery questions for predicting context speciﬁc behavior. Turning
to self-employment we would expect the opposite relationship with risk attitudes. The co-
eﬃcient estimates in Column (4) conﬁrm this expectation, showing that self-employment
is positively correlated with willingness to take risks in the career context, as well as with
willingness to take risks in general and in ﬁnancial matters. The career speciﬁc measure,
however, is the overall best predictor of self-employment.
In Column (5) we turn to risky health behavior in the form of smoking. Willingness
to take risks in general has a strong positive impact on the propensity to smoke, but
willingness to take risks in the domain of health has an even greater impact, as indicated
by the larger marginal eﬀect and the higher log likelihood. The case of smoking is of
30particular interest given that smoking has been used as an instrument for risk attitudes,
in cases where direct measures of risk attitude were not available (e.g., Feinberg, 1977). In
light of results in Column (5), however, smoking can only be considered a very imperfect
substitute for more direct measures of risk attitudes. While smoking is strongly associated
with the willingness to take risks in the health domain, or in general, it is less correlated
or not correlated at all with risk attitudes in other domains such as ﬁnancial matters or
sports and leisure.
The regressions in Columns (6) and (7) investigate the impact of risk attitudes on
the decision to move, from East to West Germany or from West to East Germany after
1989, respectively. Column (6) shows that people who are more willing to take risks in
general were more likely to move from East to West. The same is true for migrants who
moved from the West to the East. Interestingly, none of the other measures is signiﬁcantly
positively correlated with migration.
In the ﬁnal column of Table 6 we explore the relationship between life satisfaction,
measured on an 11-point scale, and risk attitudes. We ﬁnd a strong positive association
between life satisfaction and willingness to take risks in general, and to a lesser extent,
with several other risk measures. A causal interpretation for this ﬁnding is anything but
straightforward, however. We speculate that there is an underlying personality trait that
is simultaneously responsible for risk taking and life satisfaction. It is likely that people
who are relatively self-conﬁdent and who are less inclined to worry are also more willing
to take risks and more likely to be satisﬁed with their life.38
In additional (unreported) regressions we also tested the relative predictive power
of the diﬀerent risk measures by regressing a given behavioral outcome on all of the
measures simultaneously. The results are very similar to the ones we have discussed in
Table 6, in the sense that the corresponding domain speciﬁc risk question is the best
predictor of investment in stocks, participation in sports, employment in public sector,
self-employment, and smoking, and willingness to take risks in general is the best predictor
38 In line with previous studies we ﬁnd that women tend to be more satisﬁed with their life (for an overview,
see Frey and Stutzer (2002)). Similar to Frijters et al. (2004a), who ﬁnd a causal impact of income on life
satisfaction in Germany, wealth and income both have a positive and signiﬁcant impact on happiness.
Similarly, Frijters et al. (2004b) ﬁnd that individuals living in East Germany before the reuniﬁcation
are less satisﬁed with their life in general. The coeﬃcient for having lived in the GDR in 1989, which
we included in theses regressions, is -0.475 with a standard error of [0.043], indicating that their result
holds even when controlling for diﬀerences in risk attitudes.
31of migration decisions and overall life satisfaction.
The SOEP does not provide a measure of risky behavior in the domain of car driving.
In order to test whether answers to the survey questions have predictive power for behavior
in this domain, we constructed Figure 9. The ﬁgure shows the relationship between risk
attitudes and risk taking in the domain of car driving, as measured by driving oﬀenses. The
top and bottom panels show separate results for men and women. The shaded bands in
each panel reﬂect responses by SOEP participants to the question about their willingness
to take risks when driving a car. Each band indicates the fraction of individuals, at a given
age, who are relatively willing to take risks: the darkest band corresponds to a value of 10,
completely willing to take risks, and progressively lighter bands indicate lower willingness
to take risks. The ﬁgure also plots data on all registered driving oﬀenses in Germany
during the year 2002 (the most recent year for which data are publicly available), by age
category.39 The ﬁgure plots three diﬀerent lines for driving oﬀense rates: the lowest shows
the un-weighted rates of driving oﬀenses by age category; the middle line shows the same
rates weighted by the fraction of individuals holding a driver’s license in each age group;
the highest line shows rates of driving oﬀenses weighted by automobile usage rates in each
age category.40
The ﬁgure reveals a strong correspondence between the distribution of risk attitudes
by age and gender and traﬃc oﬀense rates (both weighted and un-weighted). The larger the
fraction of risk tolerant individuals in a gender age group, the higher is the rate of registered
traﬃc oﬀenses for that gender age group. This correspondence suggests a link between risk
attitudes in the domain of car driving and actual risk taking behavior. It is noteworthy
that the relationship between traﬃc oﬀenses and risk attitudes in other domains, including
39 A driving oﬀense is registered if authorities impose an administrative ﬁne of at least 40 Euros, or impose
a driving ban, or if a court passes sentence because of a punishable act committed in road traﬃc, or if
a driving license authority makes a legally binding decision to refuse or withdraw a driving license (this
includes measures provided for by the “points system” or within the scope of the probationary driving
license.)
40 The German Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrtbunde-
samt) provides the sum of entries in the German Central Register of Traﬃc Of-
fenders in the year 2002 aggregated by gender age groups on its webpage at
www.kba.de/Abt3 neu/Verkehrsverstoesse/Personen im VZR/a Haupt Personen im VZR.htm In
order to calculate the un-weighted traﬃc oﬀense rate, we divided the number of registered traﬃc
oﬀenses for a gender age group by the total population in the same gender age group in the year 2002.
The population statistics were provided by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. Finally, car usage weights and
license weights are calculated based on information contained in the study “Mobilit¨ at in Deutschland”
(Mobility in Germany) which was authorized by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)
and conducted in 2002. For further information visit http://www.kontiv2002.de/engl/index.htm.
32risk attitudes in general (not shown), is less strong than the relationship between traﬃc
oﬀenses and risk attitudes measured speciﬁcally in the domain of car driving. This points
once more to the predictive value of domain-speciﬁc risk questions. In particular, the
low willingness to take risks in car driving among those younger than 20, compared to
car drivers in their twenties, is a unique feature of risk attitudes in the domain of car
driving, and it coincides with a lower traﬃc oﬀense rate for this age group compared to
that of slightly older drivers (see Figure 9). A plausible explanation for the relatively low
willingness to take risks and the relatively low rate of traﬃc oﬀenses for 18 to 20 year old
is the existence of a two-year probationary period, starting at the date when the license is
obtained.41 During this period, the penalty for a registered traﬃc oﬀense is particularly
severe, the toughest consequence being loss of the driver’s license.
In summary we ﬁnd that each one of our seven risk measures predicts several behav-
iors. We can therefore reject the hypothesis that the measures are behaviorally irrelevant.
This is especially true for the general risk question, which is the only measure to predict all
of the behaviors. The fact that this measure is capable of predicting risky behaviors across
very diﬀerent domains of life suggests once more the existence of an underlying risk trait
that is not speciﬁc to a particular domain. Interestingly, the general risk question seems
to capture this trait much better than the hypothetical risk question. This latter measure
not only fails to predict important behaviors but in some cases appears to make the wrong
prediction. In this sense, we also qualify the conclusions derived by Barsky et al. (1997)
and Guiso and Paiella (2005), who ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between a set of behaviors
similar to the ones we study and a risk measure similar to our hypothetical investment
question. Even though we think our results support the assumption of a stable underlying
risk preference, our analysis also shows that individual risk perceptions vary signiﬁcantly
across domains. In order to predict domain-speciﬁc risk taking behavior, it is therefore
indispensable to use domain-speciﬁc risk questions. Using, e.g., simple lottery questions
can only be considered an inadequate substitute for measures using situation-appropriate
context.
41 Most young Germans start driving when they turn 18, the legal minimum driving age in Germany. The
Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers states on its website that the purpose of the two-year
probationary period is to counteract the combination of high-willingness to take risks in general with
the lack of experience among younger drivers.
338 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to improve understanding and measurement of individual risk
attitudes. We use a new set of survey measures, collected for a representative sample of
22,000 individuals. We also use representative data from a complementary ﬁeld experiment
designed to test the behavioral relevance of these measures. Based on our analysis we can
report nine main ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that the distribution of willingness to take risks exhibits sub-
stantial heterogeneity across individuals. Second, these individual diﬀerences are partially
explained by diﬀerences in four exogenous factors: willingness to take risks is negatively
related to age and being female and positively related to and height and parental edu-
cation. A third important ﬁnding follows from the main methodological contribution of
the paper: the survey measures are shown to be behaviorally relevant, in the sense that
they predict actual risk-taking behavior in our ﬁeld experiment. Fourth, estimates of the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion for the sample provide support for the range of param-
eter values typically assumed in economic models. A ﬁfth ﬁnding is that risk attitudes
are strongly but imperfectly correlated across diﬀerent life contexts. This provides some
support for the standard assumption of a single underlying trait, but also points to a
value-added from asking context-speciﬁc questions, in order to capture variation in risk
perceptions. The sixth ﬁnding is that gender, age, parental education, and height have
a qualitatively similar impact on risk attitudes in most contexts, but that the magnitude
diﬀers across contexts. A seventh ﬁnding is that the survey measures can predict a wide
range of important behavioral outcomes, including portfolio choice, occupational choice,
smoking, and migration. An eighth ﬁnding is that the general risk question is the best all-
around predictor of these behaviors, outperforming a lottery measure or domain-speciﬁc
measures. Ninth, the best predictor of behavior within a given context is typically a ques-
tion incorporating the corresponding context, as opposed to a lottery measure or measures
incorporating other contexts.
In addition to adding to knowledge about risk attitudes, some of these ﬁndings have
potentially important policy implications. A robust and pervasive gender diﬀerence in
risk attitudes could play some role in explaining diﬀerent labor market outcomes, and
investment behavior, observed for men and women. An age proﬁle for risk attitudes could
34also have important ramiﬁcations, at the macroeconomic level. Demographic changes
leading to a large population of elderly are predicted to lead to a more conservative pool of
investors and voters, which could substantially inﬂuence macroeconomic performance and
political outcomes, increase the resistance to reforms, and delay necessary but risky policy
adjustments. Although we ﬁnd that risk preferences are relatively stable across situations,
an age proﬁle also raises questions about the stability of risk preferences over time. A role
for parental education in shaping the risk attitudes of children highlights a potentially
important role of education policy. The impact of height on risk attitudes suggests a
mechanism behind the documented relationship between height and labor market earnings.
Our ﬁndings leave open a number of intriguing avenues for future research, in partic-
ular research on the mechanisms behind the determinants of risk attitudes. One possible
mechanism is socialization. The impact of gender and parental education could reﬂect
diﬀerent approaches towards child rearing or diﬀerent norms to which the individual is
exposed. Diﬀerences in risk attitudes over the life cycle could also be socially constructed,
e.g., risky behavior in driving, sports, and health could be condoned at an early age but
frowned upon later in life. Alternatively, the mechanism could be biological or evolu-
tionary. Risk attitudes, like many traits, may be partially determined by genetics. Even
changes in risk attitudes with age could have a biological or developmental explanation.
Clearly it is important to disentangle these two explanations because of their diﬀerent
implications regarding the malleability of individual risk attitudes.
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b
i
n
a
r
y
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
w
i
l
l
i
n
g
n
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s
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t
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k
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r
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s
k
s
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n
d
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ﬀ
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r
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n
t
d
o
m
a
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n
s
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0
”
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n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
u
n
w
i
l
l
i
n
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n
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s
s
t
o
t
a
k
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r
i
s
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(
a
n
s
w
e
r
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0
-
5
i
n
t
h
e
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
d
a
t
a
)
a
n
d
“
1
”
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
w
i
l
l
i
n
g
n
e
s
s
t
o
t
a
k
e
r
i
s
k
s
(
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
6
-
1
0
i
n
t
h
e
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
d
a
t
a
)
.
A
b
i
t
u
r
(
h
i
g
h
s
c
h
o
o
l
d
e
g
r
e
e
)
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n
c
l
u
d
e
s
F
a
c
h
a
b
i
t
u
r
(
t
o
p
i
c
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
h
i
g
h
s
c
h
o
o
l
d
e
g
r
e
e
)
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T
h
e
A
b
i
t
u
r
e
x
a
m
i
s
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
-
t
r
a
c
k
h
i
g
h
-
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
i
n
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
;
p
a
s
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
e
x
a
m
i
s
a
p
r
e
-
r
e
q
u
i
s
i
t
e
f
o
r
a
t
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
u
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
.
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
f
o
r
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
m
o
n
t
h
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
R
o
b
u
s
t
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
s
i
n
b
r
a
c
k
e
t
s
a
l
l
o
w
f
o
r
c
l
u
s
t
e
r
i
n
g
a
t
t
h
e
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
l
e
v
e
l
;
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
*
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
c
e
a
t
1
-
,
5
-
,
a
n
d
1
0
-
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
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n
c
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f
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e
t
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r
o
g
e
n
e
i
t
y
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n
R
i
s
k
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
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P
r
i
m
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r
y
D
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
n
t
s
o
f
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
i
n
D
i
ﬀ
e
r
e
n
t
D
o
m
a
i
n
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
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p
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p
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c
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c
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p
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b
l
e
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l
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n
(
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)
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e
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s
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r
e
s
l
i
f
e
s
a
t
i
s
f
a
c
t
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o
n
o
n
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n
1
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-
p
o
i
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l
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m
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t
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t
s
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t
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s
ﬁ
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l
i
f
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n
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l
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s
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t
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s
ﬁ
e
d
w
i
t
h
l
i
f
e
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n
g
e
n
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n
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e
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e
n
t
i
n
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t
o
c
k
s
i
n
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o
l
u
m
n
(
1
)
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n
c
l
u
d
e
s
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
i
n
s
t
o
c
k
o
p
t
i
o
n
s
.
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x
p
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r
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l
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b
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r
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m
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r
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o
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l
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n
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ﬀ
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n
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w
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n
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h
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r
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n
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s
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i
l
l
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n
e
s
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o
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r
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s
(
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n
s
w
e
r
s
6
-
1
0
i
n
t
h
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r
i
g
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n
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l
d
a
t
a
)
.
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i
t
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e
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u
n
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h
e
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u
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r
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i
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1
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t
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e
r
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i
s
e
.
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r
o
b
i
t
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r
g
i
n
a
l
e
ﬀ
e
c
t
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e
s
t
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m
a
t
e
s
,
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
s
o
f
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
,
a
r
e
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
e
d
i
n
C
o
l
u
m
n
s
(
1
)
t
o
(
7
)
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i
.
e
.
,
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
b
i
n
a
r
y
r
i
s
k
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
r
e
ﬂ
e
c
t
t
h
e
d
i
s
c
r
e
t
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
e
d
i
n
C
o
l
u
m
n
(
8
)
.
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a
c
h
r
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o
r
t
e
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ﬃ
c
i
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e
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o
f
a
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i
n
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r
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i
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k
m
e
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s
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r
e
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b
a
s
e
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o
n
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s
e
p
a
r
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t
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
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o
n
o
f
t
h
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r
e
s
p
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v
e
d
e
p
e
n
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e
n
t
v
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r
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a
b
l
e
o
n
t
h
i
s
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
r
i
s
k
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
a
n
d
a
s
e
t
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
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h
o
s
e
c
o
e
ﬃ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
n
o
t
r
e
p
o
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44Figures Figure 1: Willingness to Take Risks in General
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Notes: The top panel shows a histogram of responses to the question about general risk attitudes
(measured on an eleven-point scale). The bottom panel shows the diﬀerence between the fraction of
females and the fraction of males choosing each response category. A positive diﬀerence for a given
category indicates that relatively more females choose that category.
45Figure 2: Willingness to Take Risks in General, by Age and Gender
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Notes: Each shaded band gives the fraction of individuals choosing a particular number on the eleven-point
response scale for the question about general risk attitudes. The dark band at the bottom corresponds to
a choice of zero, with progressively lighter shades indicating 1 through 4. The white band is the fraction
choosing 5, and the progressively darker shades represent fractions choosing 6 through 10.
46Figure 3: Willingness to Take Risks in General, by Parental Education
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Notes: Each panel shows, for the indicated sub-sample, the histogram of responses to the question
about general risk attitudes (measured on an eleven-point scale). Abitur (high school degree) includes
Fachabitur (topic related high school degree). The Abitur exam is completed at the end of university-track
high-schools in Germany; passing the exam is a pre-requisite for attending university.
47Figure 4: Willingness to Take Risks in General, by Height and Gender
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Notes: Each shaded band gives the fraction of individuals choosing a particular number on the eleven-point
response scale for the question about general risk attitudes. The dark band at the bottom corresponds
to a choice of zero, with progressively lighter shades indicating 1 through 4. The white band is the
fraction choosing 5, and the progressively darker shades represent fractions choosing 6 through 10.
In order to deal with small cell size, we pooled men taller than 195 cm with those being 195 cm
tall, and men smaller than 160 cm with those being 160 cm tall. Similarly, we pooled women smaller
than 150 cm with women who are 150 cm tall and women taller than 185 cm with those of being 185 cm tall.
48Figure 5: Responses to General Risk Question and Lottery Choices in Field Experiment
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Notes: The upper panel of the ﬁgure shows the distribution of responses of subjects in the ﬁeld experiment to the
SOEP survey question about risks attitudes in general. The central panel shows the distribution of the safe option
at the switching points in the ﬁeld experiment. The lower panel shows the average value of the safe option at the
switching point of respondents in a given response category.
49Figure 6: Willingness to Invest in Hypothetical Asset
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows a histogram of amounts invested in the hypothetical investment scenario. For
details see text.
50Figure 7: Distribution of Implied CRRA Coeﬃcients
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Notes: The top panel shows a histogram of interval midpoints of the CRRA parameter γ, which are derived from
amounts invested in the hypothetical investment scenario. See text for details about computation. The middle
panel shows the cumulative distribution function of the interval bounds of CRRA coeﬃcients for individuals
that choose interior investments in the hypothetical investment scenario. The lower panel shows the cumulative
distribution function of the interval bounds of CRRA coeﬃcients for all respondents of the the hypothetical
investment scenario, including the 61 percent of respondents choosing to invest nothing and the 1 percent of
respondents choosing to invest the entire lottery prize.
51Figure 8: Predicted Investment in Hypothetical Asset
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52Figure 9: Registered Traﬃc Oﬀences and Willingness to Take Risks in Driving
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Notes: The ﬁgure plots the fraction of risk lovers and traﬃc oﬀense rates by age groups for men (upper panel)
and women (lower panel). Each shaded band gives the fraction of individuals of a birth year cohort choosing a
number between 6 and ten on the eleven-point response scale for the question about risk attitudes in driving a
car. Progressively darker shades represent fractions choosing 6 through 10. The lines plot the rates of registered
traﬃc oﬀenses in the year 2002, the latest year for which data is available at the German Federal Bureau of Motor
Vehicles and Drivers (Kraftfahrtbundesamt). Weighted oﬀense rates are calculated based on information about car
usage and driver’s license ownership.
Data Sources: Risk attitudes are obtained from the SOEP, own calculations. The number of
entries in the German Central Register of Traﬃc Oﬀenders in the year 2002 (aggregated by
gender age groups) are obtained from the Federal Bureau of Motor Vehicles and Drivers at
www.kba.de/Abt3 neu/Verkehrsverstoesse/Personen im VZR/a Haupt Personen im VZR.htm Data on popu-
lation by gender cohorts in 2002 was provided by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce. Finally, usage weights and license
weights are calculated based on information contained in the study “Mobilit¨ at in Deutschland” (Mobility in
Germany) which was authorized by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) and conducted in 2002.
For further information visit http://www.kontiv2002.de/engl/index.htm.
53A Appendix
Table A.1: Determinants of Risk Attitudes
Dependent Variable:
Willingness to take Risks in the Domain of: Hypothetical
General Car Financial Sports & Career Health Investment
Driving Matters Leisure Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Female -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.083*** -0.107*** -0.087*** -0.053*** -6,793.28***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [936.11]
Age (in years) -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -200.19***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [44.42]
Abitur Mother 0.003*** 0.001* 0.001** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.000 105.15*
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [57.73]
Abitur Father 0.027 0.015 0.024** 0.011 0.013 0.004 89.58
[0.017] [0.013] [0.010] [0.014] [0.015] [0.012] [1,434.26]
Height (in cm) -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 0.017 -0.011 0.002 2,595.48**
[0.013] [0.009] [0.006] [0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [1,085.43]
Married -0.022* -0.01 -0.020*** -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.026*** -2,968.57**
[0.013] [0.010] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [1,205.55]
Divorced 0.019 0.010 -0.013 0.000 0.015 0.001 -1,996.36
[0.018] [0.014] [0.009] [0.015] [0.017] [0.013] [1,636.44]
Widowed -0.021 -0.018 -0.008 -0.032* -0.049** -0.022 -2,105.16
[0.022] [0.020] [0.013] [0.019] [0.021] [0.015] [2,095.39]
1 Child born after 1987 -0.005 0.003 0.015** -0.020** 0.022* -0.001 537.16
[0.012] [0.009] [0.007] [0.010] [0.012] [0.009] [1,147.58]
2 Children born after 1987 -0.012 0.002 0.011 -0.024** 0.003 -0.006 321.65
[0.014] [0.010] [0.008] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [1,299.30]
3 Children born after 1987 -0.060*** -0.037** -0.016 -0.074*** -0.024 -0.033** -301.98
[0.022] [0.015] [0.012] [0.015] [0.021] [0.015] [2,190.34]
> 3 Children born after 1987 0.067 -0.061** -0.021 -0.009 -0.024 0.008 4,956.97
[0.051] [0.025] [0.019] [0.036] [0.042] [0.036] [4,487.15]
Catholic -0.017* -0.003 0.000 -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 11.45
[0.010] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.009] [0.007] [910.44]
Other Christian confession -0.085*** -0.007 0.006 -0.050** -0.059*** -0.013 -1,287.84
[0.025] [0.021] [0.016] [0.020] [0.022] [0.020] [2,729.86]
Not religious -0.035 -0.021 -0.013 -0.053*** -0.032 -0.041*** -4,742.86*
[0.024] [0.018] [0.012] [0.018] [0.023] [0.015] [2,700.84]
No confession 0.052*** 0.024*** 0.005 0.021** 0.030*** 0.012 -975.35
[0.011] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [976.78]
Missing Religion 0.004 -0.026 -0.032 -0.051 0.004 0.024 -1,714.75
[0.049] [0.041] [0.021] [0.039] [0.052] [0.041] [4,639.67]
Lived in GDR in 1989 0.026 0.008 -0.004 -0.030* -0.002 -0.008 -1,344.11
[0.020] [0.015] [0.011] [0.016] [0.018] [0.014] [1,807.18]
Lived abroad in 1989 0.016 -0.011 0.021 -0.035** 0.024 0.017 -2,622.57
[0.022] [0.016] [0.014] [0.016] [0.021] [0.016] [2,058.15]
Residence in 1989 missing 0.063 -0.102** 0.096 0.026 0.139 2,904.00
[0.120] [0.048] [0.110] [0.107] [0.104] [7,592.96]
Lives in East Germany in 2004 -0.009 -0.012 -0.005 0.02 0.036* 0.002 -1,944.15
[0.019] [0.014] [0.011] [0.017] [0.019] [0.014] [1,801.72]
German Nationality -0.005 0.003 -0.019 0.01 0.006 0.000 -3,826.93**
[0.019] [0.014] [0.012] [0.016] [0.018] [0.014] [1,879.63]
School Degree 0.022 0.026 0.012 0.029 0.047* 0.011 3,975.51
[0.027] [0.022] [0.015] [0.023] [0.026] [0.020] [3,248.04]
Abitur 0.043*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.027*** 3,674.81***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.008] [873.17]
Subjective Health Status -0.013*** 0.004 0.005* -0.015*** -0.002 0.008** -1,793.54***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [436.00]
Smoker 0.063*** 0.019*** -0.006 0.012* 0.037*** 0.081*** 940.04
[0.009] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [784.99]
Weight (in kg) 0.000 0.001** -0.000** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** -66.20**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [28.12]
Enrolled in School 0.029 -0.064** -0.039* 0.008 -0.072* -0.026 -3,929.09
[0.064] [0.030] [0.023] [0.048] [0.043] [0.035] [5,594.65]
Enrolled in College/University -0.034 -0.048*** -0.039*** 0.034 -0.040* -0.022 1,300.17
[0.027] [0.016] [0.009] [0.025] [0.023] [0.017] [2,591.62]
54Table A.1: continued: Determinants of Risk Attitudes
Dependent Variable:
Willingness to take Risks in the Domain of: Hypothetical
General Car Financial Sports & Career Health Investment
Driving Matters Leisure Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Public Sector:
Unskilled Blue Collar -0.212*** -0.107*** 0.025 0.001 -0.118*** -0.027 -8,956.93
[0.037] [0.026] [0.046] [0.059] [0.041] [0.041] [6,945.98]
Skilled Blue Collar -0.180*** -0.065** -0.032* -0.089*** -0.160*** -0.058** -2,679.29
[0.033] [0.026] [0.019] [0.030] [0.023] [0.024] [4,835.20]
Blue Collar Craftsman -0.129*** -0.067*** 0.000 -0.022 -0.138*** -0.042* -3,029.66
[0.033] [0.022] [0.024] [0.034] [0.023] [0.024] [4,254.87]
Blue Collar Foreman -0.193** -0.026 -0.027 -0.180*** 6,953.86
[0.081] [0.057] [0.105] [0.052] [15,391.39]
Blue Collar Master -0.044 -0.052 -0.029 0.141 -0.126 -0.024 4,120.91
[0.136] [0.078] [0.056] [0.131] [0.077] [0.083] [9,582.80]
Unskilled White Collar -0.195* 0.18 -0.039 0.212 -6,902.71
[0.113] [0.240] [0.137] [0.245] [15,937.23]
Skilled White Collar -0.07 -0.077** -0.035 -0.051 -0.118*** -0.008 -6,711.54
[0.052] [0.031] [0.026] [0.043] [0.036] [0.039] [5,336.95]
White Collar Technician -0.053 -0.011 -0.032** -0.017 -0.084*** -0.046** -1,577.79
[0.034] [0.026] [0.015] [0.030] [0.026] [0.020] [3,200.12]
White Collar Master -0.093*** -0.009 0.004 0.018 -0.084*** -0.032** -1,991.13
[0.021] [0.018] [0.014] [0.022] [0.018] [0.015] [2,281.49]
Highly-Skilled White Collar -0.045 -0.050*** 0.013 0.026 -0.036 -0.011 3,119.11
[0.028] [0.017] [0.017] [0.027] [0.024] [0.019] [2,590.29]
White Collar Management 0.019 0.026 0.167* 0.016 0.037 0.022 -11,739.48
[0.097] [0.073] [0.088] [0.076] [0.088] [0.069] [8,388.50]
Civil Servant 0.189 0.024 -0.017 0.290** 0.114 0.227* 13,758.21
[0.134] [0.089] [0.048] [0.129] [0.121] [0.125] [12,358.40]
Civil Servant Intermediate -0.058* -0.013 -0.021 0.061* -0.057** -0.027 -3,109.50
[0.034] [0.026] [0.016] [0.035] [0.028] [0.022] [3,515.81]
Civil Servant High -0.049* -0.037** -0.008 0.024 -0.055** -0.018 1,315.78
[0.028] [0.019] [0.015] [0.027] [0.024] [0.019] [2,668.61]
Civil Servant Executive -0.05 -0.063*** -0.009 0.058* -0.015 -0.043** 4,120.07
[0.031] [0.019] [0.016] [0.033] [0.029] [0.019] [3,031.33]
Private Sector:
Unskilled Blue Collar -0.111*** -0.019 -0.026** -0.027 -0.132*** -0.043*** -5,751.52**
[0.020] [0.017] [0.010] [0.019] [0.014] [0.014] [2,389.73]
Skilled Blue Collar -0.134*** -0.043* -0.012 -0.052* -0.116*** -0.040* -2,761.51
[0.027] [0.023] [0.019] [0.027] [0.022] [0.021] [3,464.72]
Blue Collar Craftsman -0.093*** -0.044*** -0.020** -0.030* -0.123*** -0.060*** -2,796.78
[0.020] [0.014] [0.010] [0.018] [0.014] [0.012] [2,231.24]
Blue Collar Foreman -0.065* -0.002 -0.013 0.009 -0.028 -0.027 -3,852.31
[0.038] [0.029] [0.019] [0.035] [0.034] [0.026] [4,037.80]
Blue Collar Master -0.008 -0.019 -0.032 -0.003 0.045 -0.022 4,053.64
[0.056] [0.036] [0.020] [0.046] [0.054] [0.034] [5,641.84]
Unskilled White Collar 0.019 -0.011 -0.001 -0.041 -0.056 -0.037 3,038.84
[0.081] [0.053] [0.038] [0.057] [0.058] [0.045] [6,165.43]
White Collar Technician -0.044* -0.021 -0.013 -0.002 -0.088*** -0.046*** -2,469.55
[0.025] [0.018] [0.013] [0.023] [0.019] [0.014] [2,513.45]
Highly-Skilled White Collar -0.069*** -0.023 0.005 0.012 -0.053*** -0.038*** 1,639.23
[0.019] [0.015] [0.012] [0.019] [0.017] [0.013] [2,018.03]
White Collar Master -0.011 0.013 0.026* 0.042* 0.012 -0.011 4,103.48*
[0.023] [0.018] [0.015] [0.022] [0.021] [0.016] [2,135.24]
White Collar Management 0.126*** 0.058* 0.081*** 0.071** 0.139*** -0.001 3,763.05
[0.040] [0.030] [0.027] [0.034] [0.039] [0.024] [3,298.69]
Self-employment:
Professional Services 0.038 0.002 0.042** 0.055* 0.124*** -0.024 3,412.22
[0.032] [0.023] [0.021] [0.029] [0.033] [0.019] [2,874.27]
Other Self-employment 0.086** -0.010 0.029 0.017 0.090*** -0.043** -44.33
[0.034] [0.022] [0.020] [0.028] [0.032] [0.017] [2,984.52]
Agriculture -0.078 -0.058 -0.049** 0.016 0.111 -0.027 -23,432.24***
[0.062] [0.042] [0.021] [0.077] [0.078] [0.045] [8,440.01]
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Dependent Variable:
Willingness to take Risks in the Domain of: Hypothetical
General Car Financial Sports & Career Health Investment
Driving Matters Leisure Choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Trainees/Apprentices
Apprentice (technical) 0.017 -0.045** -0.027** 0.023 -0.084*** -0.022 -2,897.21
[0.037] [0.020] [0.014] [0.030] [0.024] [0.021] [3,288.50]
Apprentice (clerical) -0.036 -0.049** -0.030* 0.007 -0.060* -0.033 3,310.49
[0.040] [0.023] [0.015] [0.033] [0.031] [0.024] [3,576.41]
Intern/Trainee 0.062 0.019 0.061 -0.011 0.007 0.020 7,425.67
[0.086] [0.059] [0.056] [0.058] [0.070] [0.057] [6,326.91]
Other 0.024 -0.041 -0.045*** 0.023 -0.077** -0.001 -4,815.38
[0.059] [0.031] [0.014] [0.046] [0.038] [0.037] [4,923.30]
Unemployed -0.049** -0.050*** -0.024** -0.025 -0.063*** -0.057*** -4,938.20**
[0.021] [0.014] [0.010] [0.018] [0.018] [0.012] [2,222.47]
Non-Participating -0.098*** -0.080*** -0.017 -0.014 -0.110*** -0.062*** -5,261.98**
[0.019] [0.012] [0.011] [0.019] [0.015] [0.011] [2,089.65]
Retired (Pension) -0.120*** -0.065*** -0.026** -0.022 -0.115*** -0.059*** -5,613.56***
[0.020] [0.014] [0.011] [0.019] [0.017] [0.014] [2,116.17]
Log(Household Wealth in 2002) 0.002** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002 0.000 164.53*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [94.87]
Log(Household Debt in 2002) 0.008*** 0.002 0.003** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001 92.91
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [206.41]
Log(Household Income 2004) 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004*** 121.28
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [205.74]
Life Satisfaction 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 516.80**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [228.76]
Month of Interview:
January -0.076 -0.004 -0.023 -0.081 -0.036 -0.007 15,047.38
[0.083] [0.065] [0.033] [0.059] [0.089] [0.069] [12,974.33]
February -0.054 0.007 -0.018 -0.062 -0.018 -0.003 15,069.07
[0.083] [0.066] [0.033] [0.059] [0.090] [0.069] [12,979.48]
March -0.078 0.001 -0.022 -0.069 -0.028 -0.007 18,048.17
[0.079] [0.066] [0.031] [0.055] [0.088] [0.068] [12,983.84]
April -0.034 0.019 -0.017 -0.035 -0.005 0.012 16,883.39
[0.083] [0.071] [0.031] [0.059] [0.092] [0.074] [13,039.52]
May -0.085 -0.020 -0.029 -0.066 -0.042 -0.025 13,296.42
[0.075] [0.061] [0.026] [0.051] [0.084] [0.062] [13,065.10]
June -0.092 -0.006 -0.035 -0.075 -0.055 -0.024 17,848.73
[0.074] [0.066] [0.024] [0.048] [0.081] [0.063] [13,094.10]
July -0.095 -0.037 -0.024 -0.059 -0.024 -0.007 15,390.35
[0.073] [0.056] [0.028] [0.053] [0.088] [0.069] [13,145.25]
August -0.048 -0.040 -0.024 -0.070 -0.011 -0.033 16,334.55
[0.085] [0.056] [0.030] [0.050] [0.094] [0.060] [13,266.70]
September -0.055 -0.078* -0.040 0.000 0.032 -0.039 19,959.06
[0.091] [0.046] [0.025] [0.075] [0.113] [0.061] [13,859.30]
Constant -23,905.91
[16,850.44]
Pseudo-R2 0.095 0.102 0.100 0.127 0.103 0.066
Pseudo Log Likelihood -9,817 -6,892 -4,945 -7,745 -7,983 -6,770 -19,197
Observations 17,435 1,6540 17,337 17,198 15,872 17,423 17,417
Probit marginal eﬀects estimates. The dependent variables are binary measures of willingness to take risks in
diﬀerent domains, where “0” indicates unwillingness to take risks (answers 0-5 in the original data) and “1”
indicates willingness to take risks (answers 6-10 in the original data). Abitur (high school degree) includes
Fachabitur (topic related high school degree). The Abitur exam is completed at the end of university-track
high-schools in Germany; passing the exam is a pre-requisite for attending university. Wealth and income
controls are in logs. Logged absolute values of negative wealth are added as separate control. The income
data for 2004 are based on answers to questions about current gross monthly income sources at the time of
the interview. We also used the net monthly income measure that is available as a generated variable in the
SOEP; the results (not reported here) are essentially the same. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for
clustering at the household level; ***, **, * indicate signiﬁcance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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